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Abstract 
The global economic crisis and its effects have changed the context for public sector 
unions in Canada. There is evidence that an intensified offensive against public sector 
unions is beginning. Few public sector unions are prepared to respond adequately to 
such an offensive, as the important 2009 strike by Toronto municipal workers 
illustrates. In this more difficult context, change within public sector unions is 
increasingly urgent. The most promising direction for union renewal lies in the praxis of 
social movement unionism. However, there are very few signs of moves to promote 
this approach within Canadian public sector unions. 
 
Résumé 
La crise économique globale et ses effets ont changé le contexte pour les syndicats du 
secteur public au Canada. Il y a des signes qu’une attaque violente contre les syndicats 
du secteur public a commencé. Peu de syndicats du secteur public sont prêts à 
répondre dans une manière satisfaisante à cette attaque, comme le montre la grève 
importante des travailleurs municipaux à Toronto en 2009. Dans ce contexte plus 
difficile, des changements au sein des syndicats du secteur public sont de plus en plus 
urgents. La direction la plus prometteuse pour une renaissance syndicale est la pratique 
d’un syndicalisme de mouvement social. Toutefois, il y a très peu d’indices que les 
syndicats du secteur public au Canada s’inscrivent dans une telle approche. 
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The	global	economic	crisis,	the	ensuing	responses	from	all	levels	of	
government	and	the	development	of	a	political	climate	more	favorable	to	
the	neoliberal	project	of	restructuring	the	public	sector	have	changed	the	
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context	for	public	sector	unions	in	Canada.	There	is	evidence	that	
governments	and	other	public	sector	employers	are	beginning	to	conduct	
an	intensified	offensive	against	public	sector	unions.	This	offensive	will	
likely	feature	not	only	freezes	for	wage	and	benefit	costs	but	also	other	
concessionary	demands	and	job	cuts,	along	with	new	efforts	to	restructure	
the	public	sector.	Few	public	sector	unions	are	prepared	to	respond	
adequately	to	a	more	aggressive	employers’	offensive,	as	the	important	
strike	of	Toronto	municipal	workers	in	the	summer	of	2009	illustrates.	
This	highlights	the	increasingly	urgent	need	for	efforts	to	bring	about	
change	within	public	sector	unions.	But	what	kind	of	change	is	most	
appropriate	in	these	circumstances?	Union	renewal	always	involves	the	
cultivation	of	a	particular	mode	of	union	praxis.	Currently,	most	Canadian	
public	sector	unions	continue	to	practice	social	unionism.	Three	alternative	
modes	of	union	praxis	present	themselves	as	potentially	more	effective:		
corporate	unionism,	mobilization	unionism	and	social	movement	
unionism.	I	will	argue	that	the	most	promising	alternative	is	social	
movement	unionism.	However,	there	are	at	present	very	few	signs	of	
moves	to	promote	this	approach	within	Canadian	public	sector	unions,	for	
reasons	that	will	be	briefly	considered.	
	
Neoliberalism, Public Sector Restructuring and the ‘Great Recession’  
The	global	economic	crisis	that	began	in	2008	–	the	worst	crisis	since	the	
Great	Depression	of	1929‐1939	–	has	been	a	crisis	of	capitalism	in	its	
neoliberal	form.	Neoliberalism	is	best	understood	as	a	project	for	
reorganizing	capitalism	in	response	to	the	global	economic	crisis	of	the	
mid‐1970s.	That	crisis	exposed	the	limits	of	the	Keynesian‐compromise	
organization	of	capitalism	that	had	taken	shape	after	the	Second	World	
War	and	provided	the	framework	for	the	uniquely	sustained	period	of	
expansion	that	followed,	one	of	whose	features	was	a	major	expansion	of	
the	public	sector	(McNally	2011).	As	Alfredo	Saad‐Filho	and	Deborah	
Johnston	(2005,	3)	have	argued:	
	
Although every country is different, and historical analysis can reveal 
remarkably rich details, the overall picture is clear. The most basic feature of 
neoliberalism is the systematic use of state power to impose (financial) market 
imperatives, in a domestic process that is replicated internationally by 
‘globalisation.’   
	
	 The	neoliberal	project	has	driven	the	restructuring	of	the	public	
sector	that	has	been	taking	place	across	the	advanced	capitalist	countries	
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for	the	last	three	decades.	This	restructuring	is	associated	with	the	ideas	of	
New	Public	Management	(NPM),	but	it	is	not	persuasive	to	assess	the	
changes	within	NPM’s	own	terms,	“as	being	primarily	concerned	with	
efficiency,	effectiveness	and	economy”	(Carter	2006,	148).	The	essence	of	
public	sector	restructuring	is	an	effort	to	reconstruct	the	broad	welfare	
state	form	of	public	administration	developed	during	the	long	post‐war	
boom	in	order	to	reorient	the	public	sector	towards	supporting	economic	
competitiveness	under	neoliberal	capitalism	(Camfield	2007;	Carter	2006).	
This	process	can	be	analysed	as	the	construction	of	“lean	states,”	states	
better‐suited	to	remaking	societies	in	the	age	of	lean	production	(Sears	
1999).	The	degree	to	which	this	has	actually	taken	place	has	varied	widely	
across	the	advanced	capitalist	countries	(Carter	2006).	
To	the	extent	that	it	has	taken	place,	the	construction	of	lean	states	
has	been	harmful	to	the	users	of	public	services,	public	sector	workers	and	
their	unions.	Unfortunately,	research	on	public	sector	workers	has	suffered	
from	the	broad	intellectual	trend	identified	by	Perry	Anderson	(2010,	6):	
“Studies	of	the	working	class	anywhere	in	the	world,	once	a	staple	of	
history	and	sociology,	have	declined	along	with	labour	movements	as	a	
political	force.”	However,	such	recent	research	on	public	sector	workers	in	
Canada	as	has	been	published	continues	to	confirm	the	negative	impact	on	
workers	of	neoliberal	work	reorganization.	For	example,	Norene	Pupo	and	
Andy	Noack	(2009,	2010)	have	shown	how	the	federal	government’s	
creation	of	Service	Canada	call	centres	has	been	experienced	by	most	call	
centre	workers	as	having	created	a	more	stressful,	speeded‐up	work	
environment	in	which	they	are	subjected	to	harsher	management	and	less	
able	to	deliver	quality	public	service.	
This	is	not	the	place	to	examine	contending	accounts	of	the	causes	
and	dynamics	of	the	economic	crisis,	important	though	they	are.1	But	it	is	
vital	to	note	that	one	consequence	of	this	crisis	has	been	a	rapid	growth	of	
state	debt	in	the	advanced	capitalist	countries.	The	cost	of	the	neoliberal	
remedy	for	capitalism’s	crisis	‐‐	bailing‐out	failing	financial	firms	and	
engaging	in	stimulus	spending	to	prevent	the	crisis	from	becoming	a	
catastrophic	collapse	‐‐	has	been	estimated	at	approximately	$20	trillion	
(McNally	2011,	2‐3).	This	unprecedented	intervention	to	shore	up	global	
capitalism,	along	with	falling	tax	revenues	and	higher	welfare	costs	caused	
by	the	recession,	have	driven	up	debt	to	GDP	ratios	in	the	advanced	
capitalist	countries.	While	economic	predictions	of	this	kind	often	turn	out	
to	be	inaccurate,	the	International	Monetary	Fund’s	(IMF	2010,	7)	estimate	
                                                 
1 Of the explanations offered thus far, I find McNally 2011 the most persuasive. 
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in	February	2010	was	that	across	the	G‐7	countries	“large	fiscal	deficits,	
reflecting	cyclical	factors,	financial	support	measures,	stimulus	packages,	
and	underlying	structural	spending	pressures	are	expected	to	raise	the	
general	government	gross	debt‐to‐GDP	ratio	to	about	120	percent	in	2014,	
from	around	80	percent	in	2008.”	
For	partisans	of	neoliberalism,	for	whom	deficits	are	anathema	(at	
least	in	principle),	the	rapid	growth	of	debt	is	a	nightmarish	scenario.	
Neoliberal	opposition	to	budget	deficits	has	several	rationales.	One	is	the	
straightforward	desire	to	weaken	social	programs	and	the	public	sector	in	
order	to	reinforce	the	subordination	of	the	state	and	workers	to	“the	
power	of	money”	(Clarke	1988,	356).	Restraining	deficits	serves	to	limit	
any	moves	to	enlarge	the	public	sector	or	redefine	it	in	ways	that	would	be	
advantageous	to	workers.	A	second	is	that	deficits	are	alleged	to	cause	
inflation.2	Inflation	is	demonized	by	neoliberals	for	a	variety	of	reasons.	It	
squeezes	the	real	value	of	revenue	flows	derived	from	interest	payments,	
thereby	reducing	the	profitability	of	financialized	capital.	Inflation	could,	
hypothetically,	lead	to	spiraling	wage	demands	from	workers,	although	the	
current	conditions	of	wage‐earners	and	unions	in	the	advanced	capitalist	
countries	do	not	lend	credibility	to	a	scenario	of	rising	wage	militancy.	
Higher	levels	of	inflation	would	also	allow	less‐competitive	firms	to	take	
advantage	of	fluctuating	prices	of	inputs	and	outputs,	thereby	allowing	
them	to	survive	without	investing	in	the	newest	forms	of	work	
organization	and	technology.	A	third	anti‐deficit	rationale	is	concern	about	
the	“crowding‐out	effect,”	by	which	public	sector	borrowing	forces	up	
interest	rates,	to	the	detriment	of	private	investors,	although	this	argument	
has	receded	in	recent	years.	While	neoliberal	ideology	is	important	in	
explaining	deficit‐reduction	policies,	such	policies	are	not	simply	the	result	
of	its	influence.	States	are	also	subject	to	material	disciplinary	pressures	to	
cut	spending	exerted	by	speculators	through	international	markets	for	
bonds,	which	states	must	sell	in	order	to	finance	deficit	spending,	and	also	
through	currency	markets	(Camfield	and	Serge	2010).	
For	these	reasons,	then,	deficit‐slashing	is	high	on	the	political	
agenda	across	the	advanced	capitalist	countries,	including	Canada	(Albo	
and	Evans	2010).	The	IMF	projects	that	Canada’s	debt	to	GDP	ratio	for	
2011	will	be	the	second	lowest	of	the	G‐7	states	(IMF	2010,	20).	However,	
the	IMF	calculation	combines	federal	and	provincial	government	debt;	the	
Canadian	federal	debt	to	GDP	ratio	is,	in	fact,	by	far	the	lowest	in	the	G‐7	
(McClearn	2010).	Nevertheless,	deficit	reduction	became	prominent	in	
                                                 
2 For a critique of this and related ideas, see Beitel 2010. 
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federal	and	provincial	politics	in	2010.	Cost‐cutting	has	also	become	a	
major	political	theme	at	the	municipal	level.	
The	implications	of	deficit‐reducing	fiscal	policies	for	the	public	
sector	are	clear.	Neoliberal	measures	to	reduce	debt	and	deficits	will	draw	
on	a	well‐established	repertoire	that	includes	freezing	or	reducing	labour	
costs,	cutting	jobs,	various	forms	of	privatization	(including	contracting‐
out	and	Public‐Private	Partnerships)	and	the	simple	erosion	or	elimination	
of	services.	Neoliberal	deficit‐slashing	packages	are	being	implemented	in	
a	growing	number	of	US	and	European	jurisdictions,	with	California	and	
Greece	at	the	forefront	(Albo	and	Evans	2010).	In	addition,	the	influence	of	
the	idea	that	deficits	and	debt	must	be	reduced	contributes	to	an	
ideological	climate	that	is	more	hostile	to	the	public	sector.	In	such	a	
climate	it	is	easier	for	governments	to	redesign	the	public	sector	in	
neoliberal	ways.	
	
Canadian Public Sector Unions: Into a New Phase of the Employers’ Offensive 
What	lies	ahead	for	public	sector	workers	in	Canada	in	this	economic	and	
political	context?	Public	sector	workers	have	long	endured	an	employers’	
offensive	that	began	in	the	second	half	of	the	1970s	with	the	federal	
government’s	wage	control	program	and	its	1978	confrontation	with	the	
Canadian	Union	of	Postal	Workers	(CUPW).	The	intensity	of	this	offensive	
has	ebbed	and	flowed	through	what	Joseph	Rose	has	periodized	as	years	of	
“restraint”	(1982‐1990),	“retrenchment”	(1990‐1997)	and	
“postretrenchment”	(1998	on)	(Rose	2007).	In	my	view,	the	Great	
Recession	brought	the	postretrenchment	phase	to	an	end,	opening	a	new	
period	of	austerity	whose	severity	will	be	determined	by	the	interplay	of	
capital	accumulation,	state	policy,	capitalist	initiatives	directed	at	the	
public	sector	and	worker	resistance.	
Here	it	is	important	to	underscore	that	cost‐reduction	is	not	the	
only	goal	being	pursued	by	governments	and	other	public	sector	
employers.	Neoliberal	public	sector	restructuring	has	never	been	solely	or	
even	primarily	about	containing	or	reducing	state	spending.	It	has	also	
involved	efforts	to	modify	the	form	of	state	power,	building	lean	states	that	
can	reshape	society	in	the	interests	of	competitiveness.	In	addition,	
opening	up	the	still‐sizeable	public	sector	to	profit‐making	firms	has	been	
an	aspect	of	restructuring.	For	example,	in	Canada	“the	public	health	care	
system	offers	enormous	untapped	potential	for	profitability	and	is	thus	
subject	to	ever‐proliferating	varieties	of	privatization”	(Whiteside	2009,	
95).	All	these	dimensions	of	neoliberal	restructuring	will	be	at	play	in	the	
period	inaugurated	by	the	Great	Recession.		
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I	believe	it	is	futile	to	attempt	to	prepare	any	kind	of	forecast	in	
detail	about	the	new	period.	It	is	also	essential	to	appreciate	that	
governments,	rightly	fearful	of	reversing	the	beginnings	of	a	recovery	from	
the	depths	of	the	Great	Recession,	have	not	yet	begun	to	implement	major	
deficit‐reduction	or	other	restructuring	measures.	With	this	in	mind,	a	
number	of	recent	experiences	involving	large	groups	of	workers	illustrate	
important	challenges	now	facing	public	sector	unions:		
 In	February	2010,	faculty	at	Ontario’s	community	colleges,	
represented	by	the	Ontario	Public	Service	Employees	Union	
(OPSEU),	voted	by	51	percent	to	accept	the	employer’s	offer	which	
OPSEU	officials	had	urged	them	to	reject.	The	three‐year	contract	
ratified	was	similar	to	terms	that	had	been	imposed	by	the	
employer,	and	included	concessions	on	workload,	inflexible	time	
limits	on	grievances	and	supervision	of	work	during	non‐teaching	
periods	(OPSEU	2010).	
 In	March	2010,	a	new	two‐year	contract	covering	the	48,000	BC	
health	support	workers	represented	by	the	multi‐union	Facilities	
Bargaining	Association	(mostly	members	of	the	Hospital	Employees	
Union	(HEU))	and	recommended	by	HEU	leaders	was	ratified	by	a	
vote	of	77	percent.	It	contains	a	loss	of	two	days	vacation	time,	and	
no	pay	increases	for	most	workers	(HEU	2010).	This	is	one	of	the	
settlements	reached	as	part	of	the	BC	government’s	Early	Contract	
Discussions	(ECD)	approach,	which	involves	offers	that	include	a	
measure	of	job	security	for	unions	that	agree	to	two‐year	deals	that	
contain	no	compensation	increases.	The	contract	for	the	multi‐
union	community	health	sector	and	the	BC	Government	and	
Services	Union’s	contract	for	provincial	government	employees	
have	also	been	settled	on	this	basis.	The	threat	that	workers	whose	
unions	reject	the	ECD	framework	will	face	contracting‐out	has	been	
a	factor	in	encouraging	acceptance	of	the	ECD	approach.3	
 Also	in	March	2010,	the	federal	budget	signaled	that	“starting	with	
budget	2011,	they	[the	Conservative	government]	will	not	only	act	
on	PS	[public	sector]	pensions,	they	also	intend	to	extend	the	PS	
wage	freeze	in	addition	to	finding	ways	to	reduce	the	size	of	the	PS	
by	eliminating	whole	programs	(job	cuts).	Needless	to	say,	those	
plans	imply	a	serious	deterioration	in	working	conditions”	
(McDougall,	Powell	and	Duranceau	2010,	2).	
                                                 
3 E‐mail from HEU staffer, 30 March 2010. 
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 Officials	of	the	Public	Service	Alliance	of	Canada	negotiated	a	
narrowly‐ratified	contract	covering	95,000	federal	government	
employees	that	gave	up	severance	pay	for	workers	voluntarily	
leaving	their	jobs	in	order	to	gain	wage	increases	that	were	still	
below	the	rate	of	inflation.4	
 The	leaders	of	the	Common	Front	of	Quebec	public	sector	unions	
(with	the	exception	of	the	Fédération	interprofessionnelle	de	la	santé	
du	Québec	(FIQ))	and	the	Quebec	government	agreed	to	a	five‐year	
deal	with	wage	increases	of	between	seven	and	10.5	percent	over	
five	years	(barely	above	the	rate	of	inflation)	(Mandel	2010).	
 The	Ontario	government	is	pursuing	a	policy	of	no	compensation	
increases	for	two	years	for	workers	in	the	broader	public	sector	
(CUPE	Ontario	2010).	
 Despite	having	only	struck	briefly	on	two	occasions	in	the	last	
decade,	members	of	the	Amalgamated	Transit	Union	at	the	Toronto	
Transit	Commission	had	their	right	to	strike	removed	by	provincial	
legislation	early	in	2011.5	
 Canada	Post’s	“Modern	Post”	plan	involves	significant	changes	to	
labour	processes	that	have	negative	effects	on	workers.	In	the	
negotiations	for	CUPW’s	main	bargaining	unit	underway	when	this	
article	was	finalized	(March	2011),	Canada	Post	was	demanding	
large	concessions	from	current	employees	and	even	larger	give‐
backs	for	future	hires.6	
	
Although	no	comprehensive	studies	of	public	sector	collective	bargaining	
or	restructuring	since	the	start	of	the	Great	Recession	have	yet	appeared,	
these	and	other	recent	experiences	suggest	that	many	public	sector	unions	
are	facing	demands	for	contract	concessions	and	restructuring	measures	
which	they	are	unable	to	repel.	Public	sector	unions	seem	generally	ill‐
equipped	to	contend	with	the	attacks	they	are	likely	to	face	in	the	years	
ahead	from	employers	who	see	them	as	obstacles	to	fiscal	austerity	and	
public	sector	“reform.”	This	union	weakness,	not	a	new	development	
(Camfield	2007),	will	become	more	pronounced	to	the	degree	to	which	
employers	become	more	aggressive	in	the	new	period	of	austerity.	To	help	
                                                 
4 “PSAC accepts deal – barely.” Ottawa Citizen, 2 December 2010. 
5 “Banning transit strikes is a bad idea.” The Globe and Mail, 23 February 2011; “Labour cries 
foul as province moves on TTC strike ban.” The Globe and Mail, 3 March 2011. 
6 As documented on the union’s official website and at 
theworkersstrugglewiththemodernpost.blogspot.com, a site created by CUPW militants.  
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illuminate	the	current	condition	of	public	sector	unionism	and	challenges	it	
faces,	it	is	useful	to	examine	the	Toronto	municipal	workers’	strike	of	2009	
in	detail.			
	
The Toronto Municipal Strike of 20097 
Over	24,000	Toronto	municipal	government	employees,	members	of	
Canadian	Union	of	Public	Employees	(CUPE)	Locals	79	and	416,	found	
themselves	on	the	picket	lines	from	22	June	to	29	July	2009.	This	was	an	
important	strike.	It	involved	the	largest	union	(CUPE),	its	largest	local	
(Local	79),	in	the	largest	city	in	the	land.	Much	as	the	CAW’s	high‐profile	
2009	deals	with	GM,	Chrysler	and	Ford	helped	set	the	tone	for	how	private	
sector	unions	would	respond	to	demands	for	concessions	during	the	
economic	crisis,	this	strike	sent	signals	to	workers	and	employers	across	
the	public	sector	and	beyond.	It	was	precipitated	by	the	major	concessions	
demanded	by	the	employer,	supposedly	because	of	the	City’s	dire	fiscal	
circumstances	(the	City’s	budget	surplus	of	$350	million	announced	in	
March	20108	is	reason	to	doubt	this	justification).9	Most	concessions	were	
fended	off,	although	the	settlement	granted	the	employer	some	of	the	
changes	to	sick	leave	provisions	that	it	wanted,	by	giving	up	the	existing	
plan	for	all	future	hires.	However,	when	the	strike	is	examined	with	an	eye	
to	the	future	of	public	sector	unionism,	the	conduct	of	the	strike	and	its	
political	consequences	stand	out	as	more	important	than	the	settlement.		
In	the	only	joint	strike	bulletin	issued	to	members	during	the	38‐
day	strike,	the	two	local	presidents	wrote	“When	we	entered	collective	
bargaining	early	this	year,	we	did	not	imagine	that	you	would	be	walking	
picket	lines	by	summer”	(Dembinski	and	Ferguson	2009).	This	attitude	
persisted	right	up	until	the	walkout	began.	Local	leaders	refused	to	
mobilize	for	a	possible	strike.10		Nor	did	they	clearly	explain	to	members	
the	issues	on	which	they	were	refusing	to	give	concessions.11	There	was	an	
almost	complete	absence	of	communication	between	the	locals’	leaders	
and	striking	workers	during	the	strike.	Dedicated	members	worked	hard	to	
keep	the	strike	running	at	the	most	basic	level,	but	picketers	usually	had	no	
leaflets	explaining	what	the	strike	was	about	to	distribute	to	passers‐by.	No	
                                                 
7 This section draws on Camfield 2011. 
8 “David Miller’s $100 million defence.” TheStar.com, 10 March 2010 
9 Only $31 million of the surplus came from money not spent on the labour costs of the 
striking workers (“Surplus helps city balance budget.” TheStar.com, 17 February 2010).  
10E‐mail from Julia Barnett to author, 28 June 2009. 
11Julia Barnett to author, telephone communication, 23 August 2009. 
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membership	meetings	of	any	kind	were	held.	Strikers	were	left	feeling	
isolated	and	in	the	dark	(Barnett	and	Fanelli	2009,	27).	
The	corporate	media	were	filled	with	hostile	coverage	of	the	strike.	
The	unions	were	portrayed	as	greedy	and	unrealistic	for	trying	to	defend	
paid	sick	day	provisions	in	their	contracts	that	were	better	than	those	of	
most	workers.	The	fact	that	these	provisions	had	been	agreed	to	by	their	
employer	in	exchange	for	monetary	concessions	by	the	unions	in	the	past	
was	almost	never	mentioned.	This	contributed	to	what	Thomas	Walkom	
described	as	the	“unusual...	visceral	level	of	hostility	against	the	strikers	
that	emerges	in	casual	conversation:	The	workers	are	uppity;	they	are	
already	paid	too	much;	they	should	all	be	fired.”12	In	the	face	of	this	
barrage,	the	top	officers	of	CUPE	79	and	416	provided	no	leadership.	They	
did	very	little	to	rally	members’	resolve	and	counter	the	wave	of	hostile	
accusations.	They	did	even	less	to	make	a	case	for	why	defending	
municipal	public	sector	jobs	was	in	the	interest	of	all	working	people	in	
Toronto,	particularly	women	and	workers	of	colour	(a	clear	majority	of	the	
strikers	were	women	and/or	people	of	colour).	It	fell	to	Linda	McQuaig	to	
make	the	public	case	that	the	unions	were	“holding	the	line	against	
employers	taking	advantage	of	the	recession	to	demand	concessions	(if	
unions	simply	give	in,	emboldened	employers	will	go	for	more),	and	taking	
a	stand	against	further	erosion	of	public	services.”13	Strikers	were	never	
brought	together	in	large	marches,	rallies	or	other	mass	actions	that	could	
have	bolstered	morale	and,	if	they	had	disrupted	business	as	usual	on	the	
streets	of	Toronto,	applied	pressure	on	the	employer	to	settle	the	dispute	
on	favorable	terms.	
For	those	familiar	with	CUPE	79	and	416,	the	conduct	of	the	locals’	
leaderships	did	not	come	as	a	surprise.	One	former	member	who	was	fired	
as	a	result	of	his	determined	union	activism	described	Local	79	as	“very	
passive	and	very	reluctant	to	engage	in	struggle.”14	It	is	known	for	“really	
bureaucratic...	management‐style	unionism,”	with	a	leadership	that	does	
not	foster	involvement	and	is	happy	“to	be	able	to	run	the	local	without	the	
interference	of	the	membership.”15	In	2002	the	executive	committee’s	
resistance	to	mobilization	and	insistence	on	tightly	controlling	union	
affairs	led	to	the	resignation	of	almost	the	entire	strike	committee	just	
months	before	a	strike	by	Locals	79	and	416	that	was	ended	by	back	to	
                                                 
12 “Striking city workers a convenient target.” TheStar.com, 27 June 2009. 
13 “Rich cause the crisis, workers get the blame.”  TheStar.com , 16 July 2009. 
14Interview with Stan Dalton, 2003. 
15Interview with CUPE 79 activists A2 and A3, May 2004. 
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work	legislation	(White	and	Barnett	2002,	27).	In	2009,	the	top	officers	of	
both	locals	appeared	convinced	that	negotiations	would	end	in	a	
settlement	without	a	strike	because	they	had	spent	a	considerable	amount	
of	money	and	mobilized	many	volunteers	to	support	the	2003	election	and	
2006	reelection	of	Mayor	David	Miller	and	to	back	city	councillors	aligned	
with	Miller.		
Enthusiastic	support	in	the	labour	movement	for	Miller	was	
certainly	not	limited	to	the	leaders	of	CUPE	79	and	416.	In	May	‐‐	when	
employer	demands	for	a	host	of	concessions	from	Locals	79	and	416	were	
on	the	bargaining	table	(“Recession”	2009)	‐‐	Miller	had	been	welcomed	at	
the	Stewards’	Assembly	organized	by	the	Toronto	and	York	Region	Labour	
Council	(TYRLC).	Those	present	at	the	assembly	promised	to	“Work	Hard	
to	Renew	Solidarity,”	endorsing	a	Solidarity	Checklist	that	said,	in	part,	
“Helping	each	other	in	key	struggles	will	be	essential	if	we	want	to	uphold	
the	quality	of	life	in	greater	Toronto”	(Stewards	2009,	7).	
The	municipal	workers’	strike	was	nothing	if	not	a	key	struggle.	Yet	
most	union	leaders	in	Toronto	did	not	treat	it	as	such.	There	was	a	“lack	of	
concerted	mobilization	efforts”	(Barnett	and	Fanelli	2009,	27).	TYRLC	
president	John	Cartwright’s	ties	with	the	mayor	and	his	supporters	on	city	
council	were	one	reason	why	the	TYRLC	leadership	did	not	do	everything	
possible	to	help	the	strike	win.	Desperate	for	a	“friend	in	city	hall,”	too	
many	in	Toronto	labour	chose	to	remember	only	Miller’s	rhetoric	about	
social	justice	and	not,	for	example,	his	2006	pledge	to	continue	to	cut	
municipal	business	taxes	“every	year	for	the	next	15”	(Miller	2006).	
Despite	the	leading	role	on	Miller’s	2003	and	2006	election	teams	of	
Conservative	organizers	including	John	Laschinger	and	Liberal	insiders	
such	as	Peter	Donolo,16	few	in	the	city’s	unions	recognized	him	for	what	he	
was:	a	wily	politician	who	welcomed	their	support	but	had	no	intention	of	
taking	the	side	of	the	working	class	in	Toronto	due	to	his	“alliance	with	–	
and	even	greater	fiscal	and	economic	dependence	upon	–	major	corporate	
and	financial	interests,	including	many	of	Canada	and	North	America’s	
most	powerful	corporations”	(Albo	and	Rosenfeld	2009).	
The	strike	revealed	much	about	the	state	of	public	sector	unions	in	
Canada’s	largest	city.		Although	the	striking	unions	were	not	lacking	in	
numbers,	money	or	strike	experience	‐‐	Local	79	had	struck	in	2000	and	
both	locals	had	struck	at	the	same	time	in	2002	‐‐	both	were	notably	
ineffective.	The	top	officers	and	staff	of	the	locals,	committed	at	best	to	a	
                                                 
16 “Mayor’s team waiting in wings for election campaign to begin.” The Globe and Mail, 17 
October 2005: A10. 
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timid	and	conventional	kind	of	social	unionism,	had	not	readied	members	
for	a	fight.	Nor	had	they	done	much	to	build	unity	between	members	of	the	
two	locals	and	their	various	bargaining	units.	Trained	in	the	routines	of	
grievance	handling,	arbitration,	meetings	with	managers,	union	
administration	and	campaigning	for	“friendly”	politicians,	they	proved	
utterly	unable	to	formulate	a	strategy	for	victory,	devise	creative	tactics,	
motivate	members	and	make	a	compelling	case	to	other	workers	about	
why	they	should	support	the	strike.	Instead,	they	ran	the	strike	as	if	the	
strikers	themselves	mattered	little	and	the	rest	of	Toronto’s	working	class	
was	irrelevant,	squandering	the	most	important	potential	sources	of	union	
power.	
For	their	part,	many	rank	and	file	strikers	displayed	much	
endurance	and	loyalty	to	the	unions	despite	the	poor	quality	leadership	
they	received.	There	were	also	many	indications	of	how	workers	were	
affected	by	belonging	to	unions	that	operate	in	routinized	bureaucratic	
ways,	discourage	membership	involvement,	and	do	little	to	educate	and	
mobilize	members.	Striking	workers	did	not	act	as	an	articulate	force	to	try	
to	influence	what	other	people	thought	about	the	struggle	and	the	issues	at	
stake.	Picket	lines	were	often	token,	passive	and	dispirited.	At	sites	where	
both	locals	had	picket	lines	there	were	sometimes	tensions	between	
members	of	Locals	79	and	416.	There	were	very	few	independent	
initiatives	by	striking	workers	during	the	dispute.17			
The	morale	of	striking	municipal	workers	was	affected	by	their	
isolation	from	other	workers	in	the	city.	The	strike	revealed	just	how	many	
workers,	feeling	acutely	insecure	about	their	own	jobs	and	fearful	of	how	
the	economic	crisis	would	affect	them	and	their	families,	were	quick	to	
respond	with	hostility	to	public	sector	workers	defending	past	gains.	This	
kind	of	response	is	not	natural	or	automatic,	but	the	result	of	the	forces	of	
labour	market	competition	outweighing	class	solidarity.	The	attitudes	that	
led	so	many	Torontonians	to	blame	the	city’s	workforce	for	the	strike	have	
been	actively	cultivated.	For	years	most	politicians,	journalists,	economists	
and	other	“experts”	whose	opinions	are	carried	through	the	corporate	
news	and	entertainment	media	have	repeated	time	and	again	that	workers	
must	give	up	past	gains.	The	onset	of	the	global	economic	crisis	in	2008	
only	made	such	calls	more	emphatic.	Years	of	increased	insecurity	in	
people’s	lives	and	saturation	in	neoliberal	ideology	–	with	little	resistance	
                                                 
17These observations are informed by conversations during the strike with CUPE 79 activist 
Claudia White, another member of CUPE 79 who prefers anonymity and CUPE 1281 member 
Sheila Wilmot. 
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from	most	unions	or	other	social	movements	or	political	forces	–	have	had	
a	real	impact	on	the	working	class.	Elementary	social	solidarity	has	been	
corroded.		Many	people	react	with	anger	at	those	who	seek	to	defend	
rights,	benefits	or	wages	that	are	better	than	what	they	themselves	enjoy,	
rather	than	wishing	them	well.	Although	the	strike	was	not	without	
support	in	the	region,	it	was	the	hostile	response	that	was	strongest	in	
Toronto	during	the	summer	of	2009.	
Strikes	can	be	important	experiences	that	change	those	involved	
and	generate	energy	for	union	renewal.18	However,	this	was	not	such	a	
strike.	It	could	only	be	demoralizing	to	spend	weeks	picketing	with	almost	
no	information	about	what	was	happening	in	bargaining	or	on	other	picket	
lines,	with	no	inkling	of	a	strategy	to	try	to	bring	the	strike	to	a	successful	
end	and	without	ideas	and	inspiration	to	challenge	hostile	claims	and	
encourage	perseverance.	Deprived	of	any	opportunity	to	democratically	
shape	how	the	strike	would	be	run,	Toronto	municipal	workers	were	given	
no	reason	to	think	of	their	unions	as	their	organizations.	
Nor	did	the	strike	bring	municipal	workers	and	other	workers	in	
the	city	closer	together	‐‐	far	from	it.	As	two	CUPE	79	members	put	it,	“The	
strike	was	a	political	failure	when	it	came	to	mobilizing	sustained	action	
and	education,	garnering	public	support	as	well	as	linking	the	defense	of	
unionized	jobs	with	fighting	for	workers	in	non‐unionized	jobs,	the	
underemployed	and	the	unemployed”	(Barnett	and	Fanelli	2009,	28‐29).	
This	made	it	easier	for	right‐wing	populist	candidate	Rob	Ford	to	channel	
“concerns	about	particular	public	services	against	city	workers,	and	the	
idea	of	the	public	sector	as	a	whole”	(Saberi	and	Kipfer	2010)	as	part	of	his	
successful	run	to	become	the	mayor	of	Toronto	in	2010.	Ford	threatens	to	
put	the	City	of	Toronto	at	the	forefront	of	the	offensive	against	public	
sector	unions;	his	victory	led	to	the	city	council	motion	requesting	the	
removal	of	the	right	to	strike	from	Toronto’s	public	transit	workers,	a	
request	to	which	the	provincial	government	readily	acceded.	
This	strike	illustrates	two	major	dilemmas	of	public	sector	unionism	
today.	First,	a	timid	and	conventional	social	unionism	with	a	low	level	of	
membership	participation,	a	lower	level	of	democracy,	an	aversion	to	
mobilizing	members	and	no	orientation	towards	a	broader	popular	
struggle	against	neoliberalism	is	very	poorly	suited	to	cope	with	the	
challenges	of	the	new	period	inaugurated	by	the	Great	Recession.	Such	
                                                 
18This has been neglected in academic work on union renewal but has recurred in my 
interviews and discussions with union activists (for example, former CUPW member John 
Friesen, 19 November 2008). 
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unionism	characterizes	many	public	sector	unions	today	(Camfield	2007;	
Ross	2008).	Second,	in	the	context	of	an	increasingly	insecure	neoliberal	
social	environment	public	sector	unionists	defending	past	gains	can	expect	
to	encounter	significant	hostility	from	many	other	workers			With	this	in	
mind,	let	us	turn	to	the	question	of	union	renewal.	
	
Renewal in Public Sector Unions19 
There	is	broad	agreement	among	researchers	about	the	importance	of	
union	renewal	(Kumar	and	Schenk	2006).	But	there	is	no	unanimity	about	
what	union	renewal	means;	it	is	a	field	of	discussion	in	which	there	are	a	
range	of	viewpoints	about	how	unions	should	change	and	what	their	
objectives	should	be.	There	are	different	perspectives	on	how	unions	
should	change	and	what	their	strategic	objectives	should	be.	All	
contributions	to	the	union	renewal	discussion	explicitly	or	implicitly	
advocate	particular	modes	of	union	praxis.	For	this	reason,	explicitly	
putting	the	question	of	what	kind	of	unionism	can	and	should	be	practiced	
at	the	centre	of	discussions	of	union	renewal	helps	to	clarify	proposals	
designed	to	address	the	challenges	unions	face	today.	
Unions	are	complex,	many‐sided	organizations	and	every	major	
union	has	its	own	specific	features	that	have	developed	historically.	
Nevertheless,	it	is	possible	to	identify	distinct	patterns	of	union	activity	
and	ideology,	or	modes	of	union	praxis	(Camfield	2007).	In	Canada	today,	
five	modes	exist:		business	unionism,	corporate	unionism,	social	unionism,	
mobilization	unionism	and	social	movement	unionism.20	For	the	sake	of	
clarity	about	the	meaning	of	these	concepts	as	used	here,	I	will	briefly	
summarize	each.	
Business	unionism	has	a	narrow	focus	on	collective	bargaining	for	
members	of	the	union	and	adopts	a	generally	cooperative	approach	to	
dealing	with	employers.	It	accepts	capitalist	society	as	it	exists	today;	at	
most	its	supporters	advocate	small	changes	in	law	and	policy.	If	the	union	
gets	involved	in	political	action,	this	will	be	limited	to	parliamentary	
politics.	Involvement	with	‘the	community’	is	limited	to	charity.	For	
business	unionists,	unions	should	be	run	from	the	top	down	by	officers	and	
staff,	with	little	membership	involvement.	This	approach	is	practiced	in	
many	public	sector	unions,	including	those	in	which	social	unionism	is	
dominant.	
                                                 
19Some material in this section draws on Camfield 2011. 
20This conceptualization differs from that offered in Camfield 2007, which failed to distinguish 
corporate unionism from mobilization unionism. 
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Corporate	unionism	is	the	term	coined	by	Kim	Moody	in	his	
important	analysis	of	the	approach	developed	by	some	US‐based	unions	
such	as	SEIU	and	UNITE	HERE	(Moody	2007).	It	is	“a	step	beyond	business	
unionism”	that	advocates	highly	centralized,	staff‐driven	and	even	less	
democratic	unions.	It	combines	an	energetic	commitment	to	bring	more	
workers	under	collective	agreement	coverage	with	an	“almost	religious	
attachment	to	partnerships	with	capital”	and	an	“essentially	
administrative”	vision	(Moody	2007,	196).	This	mode	of	union	praxis	has	
only	a	slight	presence	in	the	public	sector	in	Canada.	
Social	unionism	is	distinguished	from	business	unionism	by	its	
greater	concern	for	social	and	political	issues	not	directly	related	to	the	
workplace	and	its	more	critical	attitude	to	neoliberal	policies.	Social	
unionists	are	often	but	not	always	non‐confrontational	in	their	dealings	
with	employers	and	governments	and	wary	of	greater	militancy	and	
democratic	membership	control.	Social	unionism	is	commonly	practiced	in	
public	sector	unions	(Ross	2008).	
Least	common	in	unions	today	are	two	alternative	approaches,	both	
of	which	are	practiced	by	small	numbers	of	activists	in	public	sector	unions	
today.	Mobilization	unionism	involves	taking	a	militant	stance	towards	
employers	and	commits	unions	to	working	for	social	change	alongside	
community	groups.	It	treats	extra‐parliamentary	political	action	as	
important.	Its	supporters	work	to	increase	membership	participation	in	
their	unions	but	do	not	advocate	a	much	greater	level	of	union	democracy.	
This	mode	of	praxis	is	called	“social	movement	unionism”	by	some	
researchers	(e.g.	Fairbrother	2008).	However,	doing	so	errs	in	not	
distinguishing	between	this	kind	of	unionism	and	another	for	which	the	
term	social	movement	unionism	should	be	reserved	(Camfield	2007).	
Social	movement	unionism	is	committed	to	militancy	and	solidarity	
among	unions	and	between	unions	and	other	social	justice	organizations	in	
a	struggle	for	progressive	social	change	that	involves	extra‐parliamentary	
action.	It	is	distinguished	from	mobilization	unionism	by	the	centrality	
given	to	democracy.	Supporters	of	social	movement	unionism	believe	that	
unions	should	be	run	by	active	memberships	and	see	democracy	as	key	to	
building	workers’	power.	21				
Taking	the	contemporary	political‐economic	context	seriously	
suggests	that	the	question	that	should	be	at	the	heart	of	discussions	of	
public	sector	union	renewal	is	this:	what	kind	of	unionism	will	be	most	
                                                 
21Fletcher and Gapasin 2008 make a case for mobilization unionism; Moody 2007 argues for 
social movement unionism.   
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effective	in	defending	workers’	pay,	benefits	and	rights,	public	sector	jobs,	
union	organization	and	public	services	against	the	neoliberal	restructuring	
that	is	likely	to	intensify	in	the	new	period	of	austerity?	In	considering	this	
question,	it	is	important	to	bear	in	mind	that	for	workers’	concerns	to	be	
channeled	into	efforts	for	union	renewal,	rather	than	into	competitive	
individualistic	strategies	for	getting	by,	it	is	necessary	for	workers	to	see	
unions	as	organizations	that	have	the	potential	to	make	positive	change	in	
the	workplace	and	as	their	organizations,	for	whose	activity	they	are	
responsible.	This	makes	democratic	membership	control	and	intelligently‐
militant	workplace	activism	vital	to	changing	public	sector	unions	in	ways	
that	increase	their	power	to	contest	neoliberalism	(Camfield	2007).		
An	energized	business	unionism	has	rightly	had	few	proponents	in	
discussions	of	union	renewal,	since	this	mode	of	union	praxis	has	been	a	
major	contributor	to	the	current	difficulties	of	organized	labour	(Moody	
2007;	Fletcher	and	Gapasin	2008).	Corporate	unionism,	practiced	in	much	
of	SEIU	and	UNITE	HERE,	has	had	more	advocates.	However,	the	
perception	of	the	virtues	of	this	kind	of	unionism	has	been	affected	by	
recent	developments	in	the	unions	in	which	it	is	strongest.	In	2009,	SEIU’s	
top	leadership	imposed	trusteeship	on	the	union’s	fast‐growing	150,000‐
strong	California	health	sector	affiliate,	United	Healthcare	Workers	(UHW),	
which	prompted	most	of	UHW’s	elected	officers	to	leave	SEIU	and	begin	to	
build	the	independent	National	Union	of	Healthcare	Workers	as	a	highly	
democratic	organization	(Winslow	2010).	UNITE	HERE	has	been	riven	by	a	
split	led	by	the	former	top	officer	of	UNITE	which	has	taken	a	portion	of	
the	membership	into	SEIU.	These	and	other	recent	events	in	the	two	
unions	have	underscored	the	top‐down,	undemocratic	nature	of	corporate	
unionism	and	how	little	attention	is	devoted	to	promoting	the	self‐
organization	of	rank	and	file	workers	in	this	kind	of	unionism	(Abbott‐
Klafter	et	al.	2009),	adding	weight	to	the	analysis	of	earlier	critics	(Moody	
2007;	Early	2009;	Camfield	2007).	This	makes	it	an	inappropriate	direction	
for	unionists	who	wish	to	resist	neoliberal	restructuring.	
Social	unionism	is	the	dominant	form	of	unionism	in	the	public	
sector	in	Canada.	As	Stephanie	Ross	(2008)	has	argued	in	detail,	the	
practice	of	social	unionism	rarely	alters	how	collective	bargaining	and	
contract	administration	are	conducted.	Nor	does	this	usually	change	low	
levels	of	membership	participation	and	heavy	reliance	on	officials	acting	in	
place	of	workers.	Supporters	of	social	unionism	do	not	seek	to	cultivate	
thoroughgoing	democratic	membership	control	within	unions.	This	helps	
explain	why	social	unionist	praxis	has	generally	not	been	effective	at	
resisting	the	employers’	offensive	and	neoliberal	restructuring,	as	the	
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Toronto	municipal	workers’	strike	and	many	other	recent	experiences	
confirm.	
This	assessment	implies	the	need	for	unions	to	explore	alternative	
approaches.	Mobilization	unionism	has	not	been	practiced	by	many	public	
sector	unions	in	Canada.	One	exception	is	HEU	in	the	early	years	of	the	first	
decade	of	the	present	century.	Its	militancy,	encouragement	of	
membership	involvement	and	efforts	at	extra‐parliamentary	mobilization	
gave	HEU	members	a	greater	capacity	to	resist	the	aggressive	attacks	they	
faced	from	the	provincial	Liberal	government	headed	by	Gordon	Campbell.	
However,	HEU’s	crucial	2004	strike	‐‐	in	which	members	were	not	allowed	
to	decide	whether	to	accept	a	concessionary	deal	or,	as	many	wished,	to	
instead	attempt	to	escalate	solidarity	action	to	try	to	achieve	a	better	
outcome	‐‐	provides	an	illustration	of	how	mobilization	unionism’s	
democratic	deficit	is	a	significant	weakness	(Camfield	2006,	2007).	This	
has	also	been	confirmed	by	some	experiences	in	US	unions	(Downs	2009).	
What	of	social	movement	unionism?	This	mode	of	union	praxis	is	
the	least	common.	It	is	dominant	only	in	a	limited	number	of	locals	in	
unions	such	as	CUPE	and	CUPW,22	though	there	are	activists	scattered	
across	public	sector	unions	who	take	this	approach.	The	decision	of	the	
June	2008	convention	of	the	Fédération	interprofessionnelle	de	la	santé	du	
Québec	(FIQ),	Quebec’s	union	of	nurses,	nursing	assistants	and	
cardiorespiratory	care	workers	(then	numbering	57,000	members),	to	
adopt	social	movement	unionism,	in	explicit	contradistinction	from	the	
social	unionism	previously	practiced	(FIQ	2008a;	2008b),	remains	unique.	
However,	it	appears	that	this	decision	has	not	been	followed	by	a	
transformative	process	within	the	union	and	it	is	unclear	if	FIQ	praxis	has	
actually	begun	to	move	in	the	direction	of	social	movement	unionism.	
Nevertheless,	experience	suggests	that	this	kind	of	unionism	is	most	
effective	at	resisting	neoliberalism.	In	the	words	of	a	FIQ	(2008a,	31‐32)	
document:	
	
a struggle carried on by a larger number of people can only result in more 
success and consequently increase bargaining power. In short, the 
establishment of practices favouring inclusive and participatory democracy 
develops the active adherence of the greatest number of people… [Similarly] if 
a coalition or an alliance only involves the top of the union hierarchy, it will not 
                                                 
22Many CUPW policies are consistent with this form of unionism, but the actual practice of 
much of the union is not, as a number of CUPW activists have made clear to me.  
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have the same bargaining power or the same penetration capacity as a 
coalition benefiting from the active support of all of its constituents. 
	
Moreover,	when	unionists	oppose	employer	and	government	demands	as	
contrary	to	the	interests	of	both	union	members	and	the	users	of	public	
services,	they	are	more	likely	to	gain	popular	support	than	when	they	
frame	their	opposition	as	a	narrow	defence	of	members	alone.	If	a	union	
under	attack	has	a	proven	track	record	of	support	for	other	unions	and	
community	organizations	the	latter	are	more	likely	to	support	the	union	in	
its	time	of	need.	When	a	union	has	previously	been	attempting	to	build	a	
broad	social	movement	in	conjunction	with	other	unions	and	community	
organizations	it	is	more	likely	that	the	latter’s	solidarity	will	take	the	form	
of	effective	action,	rather	than	simply	verbal	or	financial	support.	
Practicing	social	movement	unionism	is	no	panacea	for	the	
problems	facing	public	sector	workers,	which	are	rooted	in	contemporary	
capitalism’s	drive	to	restructure	the	broad	public	sector.	However,	the	
history	of	international	resistance	to	neoliberalism	–	including	the	
victorious	mass	strikes	in	Guadeloupe	and	Martinique	in	early	2009	
(McNally	2011,	161‐3),	the	defeat	of	the	French	government’s	attempt	to	
introduce	a	First	Employment	Contract	in	April	2006	(Bouneaud	2007),	the	
BC	teachers’	strike	of	October	2005	(Camfield	2009)	and	the	overturning	of	
the	privatization	of	water	in	the	Bolivian	city	of	Cochabamba	in	2000	
(Olivera	and	Lewis	2004)	‐‐	indicates	that	mass	direct	action	and	
democratic	self‐organization	have	been	key	to	softening	the	neoliberal	
blow	and	achieving	such	victories	as	have	been	won	against	neoliberal	
“reforms.”	This	suggests	that	social	movement	unionism	can	strengthen	
the	position	of	public	sector	unions	in	the	increasingly	difficult	
circumstances	in	which	they	find	themselves.	
There	is	no	question	that	union	renewal	through	processes	to	
transform	union	praxis	towards	social	movement	unionism	would	not	
proceed	smoothly	and	quickly	in	public	sector	unions.	Bob	Carter’s	(2006,	
148)	generalization	that	“centralised	bargaining	and	bureaucratic	
unionism	have	long	been	features	of	state	sector	unionism”	holds	true	for	
Canada,	though	the	structure	of	bargaining	is	quite	decentralized	in	some	
parts	of	the	broader	public	sector,	including	social	services	and	post‐
secondary	education.	With	the	exception	of	the	FIQ,	there	is	no	evidence	
that	the	top	officials	of	any	union	have	even	been	interested	in	discussing	a	
change	in	direction	towards	social	movement	unionism.	
There	are	a	number	of	reasons	for	this	lack	of	interest.	One	is	that	
neoliberal	restructuring	in	Canada	has	not	led	to	a	massive	loss	of	
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representation	rights	or	members	for	most	public	sector	unions;	public	
sector	employers	have	not	sought	to	eliminate	unions	altogether	and	
density	remains	high.	The	apparent	threat	level	has	not	been	high	enough	
to	trigger	widespread	discussion	and	debate	about	major	change	among	
officials	and	rank	and	file	activists.	Another	reason	is	the	institutional	
conservatism	that	develops	whenever	union	officialdom	becomes	
consolidated.	Social	movement	unionism	can	involve	forms	of	action	that	
pose	risks	for	union	institutions	and	for	officials	(especially	full‐time	
officers	and	staff)	who	depend	on	union	institutions	for	their	positions	as	
officials.	A	third	factor	is	that	the	level	of	democratic	membership	control	
involved	in	social	movement	unionism	is	contrary	to	the	established	
bureaucratic	ways	in	which	so	much	union	activity	in	Canada	is	organized.	
In	addition,	in	most	unions	there	are	few	independent‐thinking	left‐wing	
activists	who	might	organize	to	press	for	their	organizations	to	change	by	
moving	in	the	direction	of	social	movement	unionism.23	Finally,	social	
movement	unionism	has	such	a	weak	presence	in	the	contemporary	
Canadian	labour	movement	that	it	is	simply	not	a	recognized	alternative	in	
the	eyes	of	most	union	activists.	For	these	reasons,	despite	its	merits	for	
public	sector	unions	faced	with	neoliberal	restructuring,	it	is	unlikely	that	
this	mode	of	union	praxis	will	spread	within	these	unions	in	the	
foreseeable	future.	
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